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Abstract
A precondition for a well-functioning monetary system is trust. This paper
develops a neoclassical general equilibrium model in which public and private
money coexist and the impact of trust shocks on the macroeconomy is exam-
ined. In this paper, trust is modelled as limited commitment between borrowers
and lenders. A borrower who issues private money can credibly commit to repay
at most a fraction of his or her future output. The paper shows that a lack of
trust can engineer a financial crisis, with substantial effects on both the real and
monetary variables. In the model, an unexpected drop in the trust parameter
causes young workers to divert less of their savings into investment goods and
more of their savings into consumption goods. A fall in capital investment in
turn leads to a decline in real output. I also show that trust shocks can have
detrimental effects on both workers and entrepreneurs. In addition, the model
shows that, to clear the money market, an increase in the real demand for gov-
ernment money causes the price level to fall, inducing transitory deflation. This
is in line with the low inflation episodes during and following the Great Reces-
sion. The decline in capital investment and the price level also implies that the
amount of deposits has to shrink in a financial crisis. Finally, once trust shocks
hit the economy, the money multiplier drops. This is due to the decrease in
capital investment and the increase in the real demand for government money.
JEL Classification Numbers: E31 E32 E41 E44 E51.
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We think that factoring in a lack of trust, placing a limitation on the degree of
commitment, is of primary importance. In particular, we think that it is a fruitful
starting point for a theory of money. Hence the title of this paper:"Evil Is the Root
of All Money." Evil is a strong word. If the moral category is thought too sever for
something as mild as breaking a promise, then the title might be changed to "Distrust
Is the Root of All Money" (see Douglas Gale, 1982 [chapters 6 and 7]).
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (2002)
Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, cer-
tainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that




A precondition for a well-functioning monetary system is trust. Without trust, a sov-
ereign currency would quickly lose all of its value and cannot maintain as a unit of
account nor a means of payment, the very defining features of money.1 Note also that
most of what people call money is privately-issued credit (or debt), which literally
hinges on trust.2 The term credit comes from the Latin credere, meaning "to believe"
or "to trust". As suggested by the above quote, understanding trust is of primary im-
portance to monetary economics (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2002). The literature, however,
contains relatively few formal models to study trust.3 This is presumably because trust
is intangible and hard to model, and it has proved hard to integrate money and credit
1The third well-known function of money, i.e., a store of value, although essential, need not be a
distinguishing feature of money (See Borio, 2019). In fact, any asset, financial and real, is a store of
value. For example, housing is generally regarded as a good store of value, but it is far from being
money.
2Although money and credit (bank credit in particular) are inexorably linked, the difference be-
tween the two often gets blurred since credit spends just like money. A key distinction between money
and credit lies on the issuer (central bank or other). Thus, fiat money is often called public money or
outside money whereas credit is referred as private money or inside money. See Lagos (2006) for the
definitions of inside and outside money. See also Tobin (1963), Freeman (1986), Freeman and Murphy
(1989), Freeman and Huffman (1991), Williamson (1999), and Bullard and Smith (2003) for early
discussions in the literature, and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016), Kiyotaki and Moore (2018),
Piazzesi and Schneider (2018), Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019), Piazzesi et al. (2019), Bianchi and
Bigio (2020) for more recent elaborations.
3Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2018) are two notable contributions.
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into a standard general equilibrium framework of macroeconomics.4
As stressed by Arrow (1972), trust is crucial to any economic activity and a lack of
trust is the cause of much of the economic backwardness in the world. Without trust,
cooperation breaks down, financial markets are destroyed, and investment and output
suddenly stop (see Guiso et al. 2004, 2008, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Bloom et al.
2012). The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has also witnessed a significant drop in
trust (see Guiso, 2010). For example, Guiso (2010) uses the survey data of the Financial
Trust Index Survey (FTIS) and the General Social Survey (GSS) and documents that
there was a dramatic drop in trust vis-à-vis banks and financial institutions in the
latest part of 2008 and the beginning of 2009.5 He also finds that, besides the level of
trust in financial markets and institutions, trust towards people in general (i.e., how
much people trust other people, which is known as generalized trust) has also fallen
during the financial crisis.6 In the meanwhile, the Great Recession has observed an
unprecedented drop in economic activity, such as the fall in investment and output on
the real side of the economy, and the decline in credit and broad money supply on the
financial side (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2012).
What is the role that trust can play in financial crises? Could trust be one important
dimension that triggers a financial crisis? What are the macroeconomic effects of trust?
Motivated by these questions, this paper develops a neoclassical general equilibrium
model in which public and private money coexist and the impact of trust shocks on
4In monetary economics, for a theory to be workable to study trust, money and credit need to be
modelled explicitly.
5To study the evolution of trust during the Great Recession, Northwestern University and the Uni-
versity of Chicago conducted a telephone survey on a representative sample of about 1,000 American
households, known as the FTIS. In the survey, a first set of questions asked how much the respondent
trusts certain types of people or institutions with a focus on financial institutions, such as the stock
market, banks, bankers, brokers, and pensions funds (see Guiso, 2010). Similarly, the GSS has been
asking people whether they have a great deal of confidence (or trust) in banks and financial markets.
See also the World Values Survey (WVS) for a similar measure of trust (Sapienza et al. 2013).
6Guiso et al. (2009) conduct a phone survey similar to the FTIS on a sample of investors of a
large Italian bank (UniCredit) which was launched in June 2009. As in the US, in this survey trust
in financial institutions has also decreased substantially.
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the macroeconomy is examined. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (2005, 2019), trust is
modelled as a limited commitment problem between debtors and creditors. A debtor
who issues IOUs (private money) can credibly commit to repay at most a fraction θ
of his or her future output.7 The parameter θ thus captures the effective degree of
commitment, or "trust", in the economy. The focus of the paper is to explore both the
real and monetary effects of exogenous variations in trust.
The model builds on Freeman and Huffman’s (1991) overlapping generations model
(OLG) with inside and outside money, augmented with limited commitment between
borrowers and lenders à la Kiyotaki andMoore (2005, 2019). The economy is populated
by four types of agents: young workers, young entrepreneurs, old workers, and old
entrepreneurs. All agents value consumption only in their second period of life. Workers
are endowed with y units of output when young and nothing when old. Output can
be used for consumption or investment. In the model, young workers can save in
government money (public money). They can also store their wealth in private deposits
(private money) if they lend to young entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have no endowment
of good but have access to a standard investment technology. They issue IOUs (private
money) and borrow from young workers. However, since trust plays a crucial role in the
economy, how much young entrepreneurs can borrow is affected by the trust parameter
θ.
I show that in this economy an evaporation of trust (modelled as an unexpected
drop in θ) can engineer a financial crisis, with substantial effects on both the real and
monetary variables. On the real side of the economy, since there is less trust between
agents, young entrepreneurs are able to borrow less and young workers would divert
more of their savings into consumption goods. This means that young workers would
save less in investment goods, which in turn leads to a fall in real output in the economy.
7This can be rationalized by moral hazard problems or strategic defaults of debtors.
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In their portfolio, trust shocks cause the demand for public money to increase and the
holdings of private money to fall. An increase in the demand for public money also
means the government has to raise more real taxes to balance the budget. As old
workers (the previous young workers) bear the tax burden, the expected consumption
(or welfare) of young workers unambiguously falls.
It is important to note that since the model characterizes an environment where
money and credit coexist, the model can be used to explore any monetary effects,
which are often neglected by standard general equilibrium models. One salient feature
of the model lies on the price level determination. Complementary to the explanation
of the New Keynesian framework on inflation (deflation) dynamics, the behavior of
prices in this economy is reminiscent of the quantity theory of money.8 In this model,
as the real demand for government money increases, to clear the money market, the
price level simply has to fall, inducing transitory deflation in a financial crisis. This
also means the real value of money has to increase. In addition, the fall in capital
investment and the price level causes the amount of deposits to shrink. Finally, the
money multiplier is endogenously determined in the model. When trust shocks hit the
economy, I show that the money multiplier falls due to the decline in capital investment
and the increase in the real demand for government money. In a nutshell, the model
shows how trust shocks can induce a financial crisis, with significant effects on both
the real and monetary variables.
Trust is crucial to economic development and its absence is the cause of much of
the economic backwardness in the world (see Arrow, 1972). Fortunately, the past two
decades have witnessed an increasing interest in the role that trust plays in economic
activity, in many fields of economic science. From economic growth (Knack and Keefer,
8Several economists have argued that existing DSGE models cannot properly account for the
evolution of prices during and following the Great Recession (see, for example, Ball and Mazumder,
2011; Hall, 2011; King and Watson, 2012).
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1997; Algan and Cahuc, 2010) to the organization of firms (La Porta et al. 1997; Bloom
et al. 2012), from financial development (Guiso et al. 2004, 2008) to international trade
and investments (Guiso et al. 2009), from individual’s behavior (Butler et al. 2015) to
individual economic performance (Butler et al. 2016), many interesting phenomena in
economics have been related to the level of trust.9 However, the role of trust in analysis
of monetary economics and business cycle fluctuations has not been thoroughly studied.
This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, this paper
develops a simple neoclassical model which introduces a limited commitment friction
into the standard overlapping generations framework (OLG) with public and private
money à la Freeman and Huffman (1991). The Great Recession of 2007-2009 has
reignited a new interest in money and credit in the economy and the crucial rule
they could play in shaping business cycle fluctuations and propagating macroeconomic
shocks (see Jordà et al. 2011, 2013; Schularick and Taylor, 2012).10 This boosts a
new line of research which models money and credit explicitly in a general equilib-
rium framework of macroeconomics, see Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016), Kiyotaki
and Moore (2018), Piazzesi and Schneider (2018), Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019),
Piazzesi et al. (2019), Bianchi and Bigio (2020) for recent contributions.11
Secondly, this paper provides a formal analysis of the impact of trust shocks on
business cycle fluctuations. Noted by Kiyotaki and Moore (2002), understanding trust
is of great importance to macroeconomic thinking. However, the existing literature in
macroeconomics contains few formal models to study trust.12 This is perhaps because
9Since trust is playing a crucial role in economic analysis, understanding of how to measure trust
is also important, see Glaeser et al. (2000) and Sapienza et al. (2013) for contributions.
10For example, using data on 14 developed countries between 1870 and 2008, Jordà et al. (2013) find
that credit plays an important role in the modern business cycle. They find that more credit-intensive
expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries.
11Note that, however, the dominant New Keynesian DSGE framework typically adopts a cashless
economy and abstracts from money and credit altogether (see Woodford, 2003).
12Kiyotaki and Moore (2005, 2019) are two notable exceptions. However, they conduct their research
in a model where agents are infinitely-lived and focus on the impact of liquidity shocks on the real
economy. In this paper, I adopt an OLG model with heterogenous agents and study both the real
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trust is an intangible concept and thus hard to model. This paper provides an attempt
at formally evaluating the effects of trust shocks on the macroeconomy. In particular,
I follow Kiyotaki and Moore (2005, 2019) and model trust as a limited commitment
problem between borrowers and lenders.13 I show that negative trust shocks can gen-
erate a financial crisis in which capital investment and real output fall. In addition,
from a welfare perspective, my results show that an evaporation of trust can have
detrimental effects on both workers and entrepreneurs.
Thirdly, this paper explores the monetary effects of trust shocks. In particular,
this model offers a simple and intuitive explanation of price level dynamics, that is
complementary to the standard macroeconomic models. Unlike the New Keynesian
literature which emphasizes on sticky prices, the behavior of prices in this model is
consistent with the quantity theory of money.14 In a low trust state, as the real demand
for government money increases, to clear the money market, the price level has to fall,
which causes transitory deflation and an increase in the real value of money. The
economy then features a "flight to quality" and secular deflation, which are observed
in the Great Recession (see Beber et al., 2009; Ball and Mazumder, 2011; Hall, 2011;
Baele et al., 2020). In this model, it is the real demand for government money that
ultimately influences the price level.
and monetary effects of trust shocks.
13Needless to say, this is not the only way to introduce trust into a formal model. Alternatively,
in a monetary economy, trust can be captured by asset’s liquidity. For instance, one reason why
money is more liquid than capital is because money is backed by the government, and hence it is
more trustworthy (see Bigio and Schneider, 2017; Kiyotaki and Moore, 2019). Such an argument
can be justified by assuming there exists asymmetric information about the quality of capital, which
translates into a cost to obtain liquidity (see Bigio, 2015).
14Note that the New Keynesian framework has struggled with explaining the low inflation (deflation)
episodes after the Great Recession (see Ball and Mazumder, 2011; Hall, 2011; King and Watson, 2012).
That is, it seems hard to rationalize the fact that the rate of inflation has remained low for too long
after real output has picked up. For example, Hall (2011), in his Presidential Address, has called for a
fundamental reconsideration of models in which inflation depends on a measure of slack in economic
activity. He argues that standard DSGE models based on New Keynesian Phillips Curve cannot
explain the stabilization of inflation at positive interest rates in the presence of long-lasting economic
slack.
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In addition, the fall in the price level and the decline in intermediated capital
would cause the amount of private money to shrink. That is, the model generates a
contraction in private credit and money supply during economic recessions. Finally,
the money multiplier also falls in a financial crisis, due to the fall in capital investment
and the increase in the demand for government money. These financial features are
well in line with the evidence on financial crises in history (see Kindleberger, 1978;
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I lay out the physical
structure of the model—individual preferences, demographics, and technologies. I derive
the equilibrium of the model in Section 3. Section 4 evaluates the real effects of trust
shocks on the macroeconomy. In Section 5, I discuss the monetary impact of trust
shocks. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 The model
The physical environment is based on Freeman and Huffman’s (1991) overlapping gen-
erations model (OLG) with inside and outside money, augmented with limited com-
mitment between borrowers and lenders à la Kiyotaki and Moore (2002, 2005, 2018,
2019). According to Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), an agent (a borrower) can credibly
commit to repay at most a fraction θ of his or her future output. The parameter θ thus
captures the effective degree of commitment, or "trust", in the economy. The focus
of the paper is on the effects (both real and monetary) of an exogenous drop in θ, in
order to mimic an environment where there is a lack of trust between agents.
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2.1 Preferences and technology
Time is discrete and denoted t = 1, 2, ...,∞. The economy is populated by a sequence
of two-period-lived overlapping generations. At each date t ≥ 1, 2N young agents
enter the economy and 2N old agents leave the economy. In the initial period, t = 1,
there are 2N old individuals (the initial old), who live only for one period. The total
population is fixed at 4N across time and is at every date t divided evenly between
the young and the old. In addition, the population of young agents is divided evenly
between workers and entrepreneurs, so that there is a mass of N of each type. Hence,
at any given point in time t > 1, the economy is populated by four types of agents: (i)
young workers, (ii) young entrepreneurs, (iii) old workers, and (iv) old entrepreneurs.
Throughout the paper, I make the normalization that N = 1.
Workers are endowed with y units of output when young and nothing when old.
Alternatively, one can think of the young workers as being endowed with y units of
nonstorable labor or time that can be used inelastically to produce y units of output.
Output can take the form of a consumption good or investment good. Entrepreneurs
have no endowment of good but have access to an investment technology that takes
kt units of output invested at date t and transforms it into f(kt) units of output at
date t + 1. The investment function yields a rate of return f ′(k) > 0 that diminishes
with the scale of the capital investment, f ′′(k) < 0. Also assume that f ′(0) = ∞, so
that agents would always prefer to have some investment. Here, I assume a standard
production function f(kt) = kαt , where 0 < α < 1. Furthermore, assume that capital
depreciates fully after it is used in production.
I assume that an individual (a worker w or an entrepreneur e) who enters the
economy at t = 1, 2, ...,∞ values consumption only in the second period of life. For
simplicity, I also assume that preferences are linear, so that agents are risk-neutral.
Preferences are given by U it = c
i
t+1, i ∈ (w, e), for t ≥ 0. As a result, young workers
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face a trivial consumption-saving decision: it will always be optimal for them to save
all of their income. This simplified consumption-saving problem allows me to focus on
a portfolio effect, which I would like to emphasize later.15
2.2 Public money and private money
In this economy, workers are the natural savers whereas entrepreneurs are the natural
borrowers. The pattern of welfare-improving trade is clear. Young entrepreneurs want
young labor (supplied by young workers) in exchange for a share of the future output
that can be produced only through their joint effort. Note that, since labor is non-
storable, workers also need to find a means to store the value of their goods. So the
basic problem facing young workers is how to arrange for consumption when they are
not endowed. One option is to purchase government money from old agents to be sold
for goods when the purchaser is himself old. A second option is to deposit goods with
an entrepreneur, who can create capital from which a return can be paid in the next
period. In other words, there are two ways in which young workers can store their
wealth: public money and private money, which I now turn to the discussion.
Public money. Public money (or outside money) is a form of government debt,
issued by the government, with a gross nominal interest rate Rt. Here, I consider
a consolidated monetary/fiscal authority and make no distinction between nominal
government debt and central bank liabilities. Assume that a stock of nominal debt M0
is injected into the economy to the initial old.16 Note that the government debt Mt
will also be used as a means of payment. That is, in each period, young workers deliver
consumption goods (produced by their labor efforts) in exchange for government money
15Incorporating a non-trivial consumption-saving problem is easy. But doing so would only compli-
cate the analysis without adding anything to the main points I intend to make in this paper.
16One could think this as a social security program to the old generation.
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(or government debt) Mt from the old workers.17
Private money. To acquire investment goods from young workers, assume that
young entrepreneurs use a privately-issued IOU that entitles the bearer to a specific
quantity of future output. In this way, young entrepreneurs create private money.
These IOUs are a form of private debt (or credit), circulating as inside money in
the economy. Equivalently, one could think that young workers make a deposit of
investment goods with entrepreneurs (or at a bank), against which, entrepreneurs issue
a piece of private paper (IOU) that promises to pay a certain quantity of output in the
next period (see Freeman and Huffman, 1991). These deposits, just like bank deposits,
are private money. I assume that each IOU promises the bearer rt units of output
in the following period, where rt denotes the gross rate of return on deposits. In a
competitive equilibrium deposits will pay the rate of return on capital, so rt equals the
real return on capital. It is also important to note that, ultimately, it is intermediated
capital that serves as inside money in this economy.
2.3 Limited commitment
Next, I make a critical assumption to introduce limited commitment between workers
and entrepreneurs. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (2002, 2005, 2018, 2019), I assume
that, for moral hazard reasons, entrepreneurs who produce output and issue IOUs (or
private money) lack the commitment necessary to honour their unsecured promises.18
To capture this limited commitment in a simple way, assume that an investing entrepre-
neur can credibly pledge at most a fraction θ of the future returns f(kt). Consequently,
entrepreneurs are subject to a credit constraint (a borrowing constraint) that takes the
17One may think that government money trades for consumption goods on competitive spot market
in each period.
18In fact, it seems natural to be sceptical about the promises that entrepreneurs make. After all,
the privately-issued IOUs (inside money) are created "out of thin air".
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following form:
rtkt ≤ θf(kt). (1)
In what follows, I assume that the credit constraint binds. That is, the principle and
interest repayment that young workers expect to safely secure is determined by θf(kt).
The parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) indexes the effective degree of commitment, or "trust", in
the economy, and it is assumed to be exogenously given. The smaller the θ, the tighter
the borrowing constraint that an investing entrepreneur faces. The main objectives of
this paper are to examine whether an unexpected drop in θ, i.e., a trust shock, could
generate a financial crisis, and to explore any monetary effects of this experiment.
2.4 Government policy
As noted before, I consider a consolidated monetary/fiscal authority, the government.
And I make no distinction between government bonds and central bank liabilities,
since they are all a form of government debt. Assume that government money is a
perpetual instrument that yields a gross nominal rate of return equal to Rt > 1.19 The
monetary authority chooses the nominal interest rate it is willing to pay on its debt.
For simplicity, I consider an interest peg policy:
Rt = R. (2)
The stability of monetary equilibrium is checked later.
Assume that the interest and principal owed on maturing government debtRt−1Mt−1
19Note that there are several ways to interpret government moneyMt. First, one can think thatMt
is government bonds which not only earn an interest but also can be used in peer-to-peer transactions.
Second, one could imagine Mt as a central bank digital currency (CBDC), which delivers a positive,
or negative, interest rate (see Jia, 2020 for a discussion on CBDC).
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must be financed by a combination of new debt Mt and a lump-sum tax Tt > 0, that
is,
Rt−1Mt−1 = Tt +Mt. (3)
In this modelling environment, I assume that the fiscal authority determines the path
ofMt and Tt. Assume that the fiscal authority grows the nominal government debt (or
government money) at a fixed rate µ, so that,
Mt = µMt−1. (4)
I also assume that the fiscal authority passively adjusts the lump-sum tax Tt to satisfy
the government budget constraint (3), that is, fiscal policy is Ricardian.20 In addition,
I make the assumption that the lump-sum tax falls entirely on old workers.
As it proves to be convenient to express variables in real terms, I let pt denote
the price of output at date t, measured in units of government money, and define
τ t = Tt/pt, mt = Mt/pt, which represent real taxes and real holdings of government
money, respectively. Note that, government money serves as the unit of account, being
the measuring rod for all prices and contracts in this economy. Following (4), the





Note that the long-run inflation rate is pinned down by µ.




Young workers at date t enter the economy with y units of output, which is worth
of pty dollars.21 Since consumption is not valued when young, all income is saved,
with savings divided between the two available assets: government money and private
deposits. Specifically, at date t, if a young worker sellsmt units of goods for government
money, he earns ptmt =Mt dollars. This involves transactions between young workers
and old workers who are born at date t − 1. If a young worker makes a deposit
of investment goods kt with young entrepreneurs, he receives a privately-issued IOU,
which is worth of ptkt in nominal terms. If one distinguishes money and credit, then
ptkt is only measured in dollars—it is not actual dollars (government money). But, note
that private IOU is a means of payment and it spends just like money.22 Of course,
young workers expect the value of their deposits to grow, and the gross return on
deposits is rt. Thus,
ptmt + ptkt = pty. (6)
Workers then face a simple portfolio problem: how much of savings to hold in the
form of government money and private deposits. If a young worker is willing to hold
both public and private money, the two securities will have to earn the same expected
rate of return. This no-arbitrage condition can be expressed as:
rt = Rt(pt/pt+1). (7)
Note that in this economy, the real return on deposits (or capital) is controlled by
a combination of monetary and fiscal policy, with monetary policy determining the
21Note that there are less than pty actual dollars (government money) in the economy. That is,
Mt = ptmt < pty.
22Thus, private money is part of broad money supply, as discussed later.
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nominal interest rate and fiscal policy determining the expected rate of inflation.
Recall that the credit constraint (1) binds in equilibrium, i.e., rtkt = θf(kt), given





The above condition makes it clear that in this modelling environment, capital invest-
ment is influenced by two forces: the trust parameter and the real return on government
money (or deposits). On the one hand, a higher degree of trust implies that young
workers are willing to safely lend investment goods to young entrepreneurs. On the
other hand, a lower real return on government money also means agents are motivated
to hold more investment goods since government money becomes less attractive.
An old worker’s budget constraint is therefore given by:
cwt+1 = Rt(pt/pt+1)mt + rtkt − τ t+1. (9)
Given (6) and (7), the above equation can be simplified as cwt+1 = rty − τ t+1.
An old entrepreneur’s budget constraint is:
cet+1 = f(kt)− rtkt. (10)
3 Equilibrium
The focus of my analysis is on the stationary equilibrium. In equilibrium, the market
for government debt must clear. The market clearing condition is given by:
Mt = ptmt. (11)
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It is important to note that equation (11) determines the price level in this model. The
behavior of prices in this economy is reminiscent of the quantity theory of money (see
Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). In this way, given that the path of money is controlled
by the fiscal authority, any increase (decrease) in the real demand for government
money will cause a decrease (increase) in the price level, see Section 5 for a detailed
discussion.23 Because Mt = µMt−1, the expected rate of inflation satisfies:
Πt+1 = pt+1/pt = (Mt+1/Mt)(mt/mt+1) = µ(mt/mt+1), (12)
where Πt+1 ≡ pt+1/pt is defined as the gross inflation rate.














An equilibrium in this model consists of bounded sequences for mt and τ t, given
a policy vector (R, µ), that satisfy (13) and (14), for t ≥ 1. A stationary equilibrium
is defined as an equilibrium that satisfies (mt, τ t) = (m, τ), for all t. In this model,
equation (13) determines the sequence of mt. With {mt} determined, equation (14)
then determines the lump-sum tax τ t that is used to balance the government budget.
In addition, with {mt, τ t} so determined, equations (6) and (11) can be used to work
out the sequences of kt and pt.
23Note that standard New Keynesian DSGE framework (e.g., Clarida et al., 1999) has been strug-
gling with explaining inflation (deflation) dynamics in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
This approach offers an alternative explanation for why inflation has remained low since the Great
Recession. According to this model, low inflation (or deflation) is caused by a high demand for
government money.
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Let us now characterize the equilibrium path of mt. Denote m as the equilibrium
value of government money. In addition, let us assume 0 < m <∞, this means in the
steady state equilibrium the real purchasing power of government money never goes to
zero, and m → ∞ is also ruled out because it violates feasibility constraint: mt < y,
for all t. Define A ≡ θµ
R




mt ≡ G(mt). (15)
It is easy to verify that there exists a unique (non-zero) stationary equilibrium, satis-
fying m = y − A
1
1−α .24 That is, there is a monetary equilibrium m that satisfies:






Then, one can use equations (14), (6), and (11) to solve for τ , k, and p. Note that
according to equation (14), τ = (R
µ
− 1)m, for τ > 0 to hold, I shall assume R > µ.
4 Trust shocks and financial crises
Consider a thought experiment in which there is a sudden drop in the trust parameter
θ. This is meant to engineer a "lack of trust" environment. One could imagine that
an economy is initially at a high trust state, agents are then shocked by a surprised
and permanent drop in θ, and the economy enters a low trust state. The focus of the
paper is to examine the real and monetary effects of such trust shocks. Specifically, I
compare the equilibrium values of variables in a high trust regime, marked by a (ˆ),
with the steady state equilibrium in a low trust regime, denoted by a (∗), and that
24The stability properties of the equilibrium are familiar in OLG models with fiat money, where the
return on money is pegged. Note that, technically, there also exists a degenerate equilibrium, m = 0,
which is ruled out by our assumption.
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θ∗ < θ̂.
Let us start by characterizing the steady state level of government money m∗, when
the trust parameter suddenly drops. From equation (16), we get:






This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When the trust parameter drops unexpectedly, θ̂ → θ∗, and θ∗ < θ̂,
workers will hold more government money, i.e., m∗ > m̂.
Proof. The proof of m∗ > m̂ follows immediately from equation (16).
The economic intuition behind this proposition is simple. Note that there exists
a binding credit constraint k1−α = θ
r
in the economy. As the trust parameter θ falls,
young workers are willing to safely lend less investment goods k to young entrepreneurs.
Given that young workers are endowed with a fixed amount of output y, they would
then divert more of their savings into consumption goods in their portfolio. In this
model, consumption goods are saved using government money, which is owned by
old workers, thus the demand for money unambiguously increases.25 This also has
important implications for inflation (deflation) dynamics, as I shall explain in Section
5.
Note that the real return on capital r is not affected by trust shocks. By no-arbitrage
condition, rt = Rt(pt/pt+1), the real rate of return on capital equals the real return on
government money, which is determined by the joint behavior of monetary and fiscal
authorities. In this model, interest rate is pegged, whereas the path of money, and
hence the long-run inflation rate, is controlled by the fiscal authority.26 Thus, as the
25Note that there exists a spot market in which young workers sell their consumption goods to old
workers and thus receive government money.





trust parameter unexpectedly falls, young workers would unambiguously reduce their
capital investment.
Lemma 1. If there is a lack of trust, young workers would reduce their capital
investment, i.e., k∗ < k̂.
Proof. See above discussions.
Following Freeman and Huffman (1991), total real output (or GDP ) at t equals the
total endowment (Ny) of young workers plus output generated by capital investment
that was created in the previous period. Because in period t−1 each young entrepreneur
created kt−1 units of capital and there were N of those individuals, real GDP in period
t equals:
GDPt = Ny +Nf(kt−1). (18)
Proposition 2. A lack of trust causes a drop in real output in the steady state,
i.e., GDP ∗ < ĜDP .
Proof. Note that f(k) = kα and f ′(k) = αkα−1 > 0, a higher level of capital
investment would lead to an increase in real output. From (18), as N and y are
exogenously given, real output in the steady state depends solely on the level of capital
stock. Following the result of Lemma 1 k∗ < k̂, one gets GDP ∗ < ĜDP .
Next, let us turn to the examination of the effects of trust shocks on agents’ con-
sumption (or welfare in a parsimonious way). Suppose that the trust shock arrives at
date t, for those (both workers and entrepreneurs) who are born at t, their consumption
at the steady state would be clearly affected, as indicated by equations (9) and (10).
Proposition 3. A sudden drop in the trust parameter θ would reduce consumption
for young workers who are born at date t, whereas the change in consumption for young
entrepreneurs is ambiguous.27
27Note that agents do not consume in the period when they are born, consumption here refers to
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−1)m̂. From equation (9), one gets (cw)∗ = ry− τ ∗ < (̂cw) = ry− τ̂ . For young
entrepreneurs, following equation (10), ce(k) = f(k)− rk, so that dc
e(k)
dk
= f ′(k)− r =
αkα−1−r. Thus the sign of dc
e(k)
dk
could be positive or negative, depending on the initial
values of k and r.
Intuitively, once the economy enters a low trust state, young workers would choose
to increase their holdings of government money. As public debt increases, to balance
the budge, the government need to increase tax revenues. Since old workers (who were
young previously) bear the tax burden, their consumption would fall. In addition,
in the steady state, consumption for young entrepreneurs depends solely on capital
investment. A higher level of capital investment would increase future output but
would also increase the cost of borrowing. In an economy where the marginal cost of
borrowing is determined by government policy, an additional unit of investment may
increase or decrease consumption for young entrepreneurs, depending on the initial
levels of investment and cost of borrowing.28
In sum, the decline in the trust parameter θ corresponds to an evaporation of lender
confidence. Workers then do not trust entrepreneurs as much as before. This generates
a "credit crisis" or "financial crisis". In particular, such shocks have real effects on
the economy. In the financial crisis, workers are willing to lend less to entrepreneurs
so that there is a decline in capital investment. This in turn leads to a fall in real
output. Consumption for young workers also falls, since they have to pay higher real
taxes during the crisis. My analysis also shows that the welfare effects of trust shocks
can be detrimental to both workers and entrepreneurs.
the expected level of consumption when they become old.
28Note that there are also old workers and old entrepreneurs who live in the economy. However,
the welfare analysis of these types of agents is largely uninteresting. This is because they are born at
date t − 1, whereas the shock hits the economy at date t. For example, according to equation (10),
expected consumption (or welfare) for old entrepreneurs is defined as: cet = f(kt−1)− rt−1kt−1. It is
clear that their welfare is not affected by trust shocks which arrive only at date t.
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5 Monetary effects of trust shocks
Let us turn to the discussion of the monetary effects of exogenous variations in θ. As
before, the key exercise is to compare the equilibria with and without an exogenous
drop in creditor sentiment θ. I shall start by studying the steady state price level.
Proposition 4. An exogenous drop in credit sentiment θ causes a fall in the price
level, i.e., p∗ < p̂.
Proof. The money market clearing condition (11) requires that Mt = ptmt. Recall
that in this economy, the path of Mt is determined by the government (or the fiscal
authority) through Mt = µMt−1, which also implies that the long-run inflation is
anchored by µ. Since m∗ > m̂, following the result of Proposition 1, and that p∗m∗ =
p̂m̂, one gets p∗ < p̂, which completes the proof.
The above result shows that exogenous variations in trust can generate a business
cycle with a procyclical price-level. That is, a fall in real output is associated with a
decline in the price level. Note that the result of a procyclical price-level is consistent
with the canonical New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities (see, for example,
Clarida et al., 1999). The underlying mechanism, however, is quite different from
this model. In the textbook New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), inflation today
depends on inflation expectations and current output. Lower output portends lower in-
flation (or deflation). This line of reasoning, however, struggles with explaining the low
inflation episodes during and following the Great Recession (see Ball and Mazumder,
2011; Hall, 2011; King and Watson, 2012). Inflation has simply remained low and
below the target for too long after output has picked up. For instance, Hall (2011)
argues that standard DSGE models based on NKPC, according to which prices are
set on the basis of a markup over expected future real marginal costs, cannot properly
account for the evolution of prices. He has called for a fundamental reconsideration of
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macroeconomic models in which inflation depends on a measure of slack in economic
activity.
This model provides a useful alternative to explaining inflation (deflation) dynam-
ics. In this model, the path of government money is controlled entirely by the fiscal
authority, thus as the real demand for money increases, to clear the money market,
the price level simply has to fall. This implies that the value of money (i.e., 1/pt) has
to increase. An evaporation of trust thus induces transitory deflation in the economy.
It is also worth noting that the model is in the same spirit of the "quantity theory
of money" (see Jia, 2020 for a discussion). In a nutshell, in this model, it is the real
demand for government money that ultimately influences the price level.
Intuitively, in a low trust state, young workers divert more of their savings into
consumption goods. To store the value of goods, it leads to an increase in the real de-
mand for government money. Since the path of money is controlled by the government,
an increase in the demand for money would cause a fall in the price level, inducing
transitory deflation. One may interpret the situation as a "flight to quality" or "flight
to liquidity", along with a decline in output (due to a fall in investment), as often
observed in financial crises (see Beber et al., 2009; Baele et al., 2020).
Next, I turn to the discussion of the impact of trust shocks on monetary aggregates
(or credit aggregates). The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has reignited a new interest
in money and credit in the economy and the crucial rule they could play in shaping
business cycle fluctuations, and propagating and amplifying macroeconomic shocks (see
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2012). Economic historians have
argued that monetary aggregates contain valuable information about financial crises
and should be paid more attention by researchers and policymakers (e.g., Kindleberger,
1978; Minsky, 1986; Jordà et al. 2011, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Schularick and Taylor,
2012). In particular, credit plays an important role in shaping the business cycle,
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notably the intensity of recessions as well as the likelihood of financial crisis (see Jordà
et al. 2011, 2013).29 However, the dominant New Keynesian synthesis typically adopts
a cashless approach in which monetary aggregates are either absent or passive (see
Woodford, 2003).
Following Freeman and Huffman (1991), the nominal money stock at date t is the











Let us define private money Qt ≡ Nktpt = ktpt.30 And one can interpret MSt as
"broad money".
Proposition 5. An exogenous drop in the trust parameter θ causes a shrink in
private money, i.e., Q∗ < Q̂.
Proof. Given that Q = kp, since k∗ < k̂ and p∗ < p̂, we immediately have Q∗ < Q̂.
In this model, recall that private money (in real terms) is fundamentally capital
investment (or intermediated capital). It is determined by the amount of investment
goods that young workers choose to save. In other words, it is only when workers
save their endowed labor in investment goods that entrepreneurs create the exact same
amount of deposits, i.e., inside money. Once the trust shock hits the economy, capital
investment drops, so does private money. Note that although Q, a form of debt and
created by young entrepreneurs ex nihilo, is measured by dollars, it does not constitute
of actual dollars.
In addition, an increase in money stock, through private money creation, need
29Using data on 14 advanced economies between 1870 and 2008, Jordà et al. (2013) document that
more credit-intensive expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries.
30Note that I have made the harmless normalization that N = 1.
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not affect the overall price level, if the supply of private money is matched by an
increase in demand. This is an interesting result, since it is at odds with the celebrated
argument that credit creation increases the price level.31 My result shows that this
does not necessarily have to be the case. In this model, even though money stock
(broad money) is increased by credit creation, the increase in money supply is exactly
matched by an increase in money demand. That is, young workers demand private
money to store the value of their goods and use it as a claim check for future output.
In this economy, it is still equation (11) that determines the price level.
Another misunderstood concept in monetary economics is the "money multiplier" in
standard economic textbooks. According to this view, policy changes are implemented
via open market operations that change the amount of reserves (the so-called high-
powered money). Binding reserve requirements, in turn, limit the issuance of deposits
to government money. As a result, there is a tight, mechanical, link between govern-
ment money and the level of deposits (see Disyatat, 2011). In this classic description,
the money multiplier is equal to the inverse of the reserve requirement.
However, this close relationship between public and private money has called into
question and clearly been broken down during the Great Recession (see, for example,
Disyatat, 2011; Carpenter and Demiralp, 2012). In the global financial crisis, many
central banks around the world have implemented "Quantitative Easing", which leads
to a dramatic increase in the amount of money. At the same time, however, credit
growth has been declined and picked up slowly (see Anderson et al., 2017). This
contradicts with the money multiplier theory, which would suggest a big increase in
credit growth.32 Next, I turn to the description of the money multiplier in this model.
31Of course, excessive credit creation can and often do cause inflation.
32It is also puzzling to note that central banks have been struggling with bringing up inflation,
despite the fact that a huge amount of reserves has been injected into the economy. According to the
logic of my model, it is simply because the real demand for government money increases by a large
amount.
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where MMt ≡ ktmt can be interpreted as the money multiplier in this model. It is
important to note that in this modelling environment, the money multiplier is not a
constant and is endogenously determined in the economy.
Proposition 6. In a financial crisis where there is a lack of trust, the money
multiplier falls, i.e., MM∗ < M̂M .
Corollary. For a given stock of fiat money, a fall in the money multiplier would
imply a fall in total money stock, i.e., MS∗ < M̂S.
Proof. Since MM ≡ k
m
, and that k∗ < k̂, m∗ > m̂, one gets MM∗ < M̂M . And
from equation (20), MS =M(1 +MM), we have MS∗ < M̂S.
Intuitively, in this model, once the stock of government money is set by the gov-
ernment, the total money stock is determined by the ratio of private to public money,
kt
mt
, i.e., the money multiplier. Due to a lack of trust, young workers would save less
investment goods and choose to hold more government money in their portfolios, thus
the money multiplier unambiguously falls. This, in turn, causes a contraction in the
total money supply. Unlike the traditional formulation of the money multiplier, the
money multiplier is endogenously determined in this model, as a result, as it falls, so
does the total supply of money. And there does not exist a tight relationship between
government money and the money stock. My result is also consistent with the evidence
that both the total money stock and the money multiplier typically fall during a period
of financial distress (see, for example, Disyatat, 2011; Anderson et al., 2017).
A Numerical Example. Suppose that U it = c
i
t+1, i ∈ (w, e). Let f(kt) = k
α





t . The model is calibrated on the assumption that one period represents
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30 years. I set R = (1.03)30 = 2.4273, µ = (1.02)30 = 1.8114. In addition, I choose
α = 0.35, θ = 0.8, and y = N =M0 = 1.
Let us first characterize the stationary equilibrium without unexpected variations
in the trust parameter, that is, the steady state when θ̂ = 0.8. Following equation (16),




1−α = 0.5478. Real taxes are then solved by using equation (14):
τ̂ = Rm̂
µ
−m̂ = 0.1863. With m̂ and τ̂ so determined, we then use equations (6) and (11)
to solve for k̂ and p̂: k̂ = 0.4522 and p̂ = 1.8256. In addition, following the definition
of GDP , total real output ĜDP = Ny + Nf(k̂) = 1.7575. Using equations (9) and
(10), expected consumption (or welfare) for young workers and young entrepreneurs are
given by: (̂cw) = ry− τ̂ = 1.1538 and (̂ce) = f(k̂)− rk̂ = 0.1515, respectively33 Finally,
private money (credit) Q̂ = k̂p̂ = 0.8256, and the money multiplier M̂S = k̂
m̂
= 0.8256.
Now, let us consider the thought experiment to mimic a financial crisis, which is
engineered by a lack of trust. Suppose that there is an unexpected drop in the trust
parameter θ (trust shocks), from θ̂ = 0.8 to θ∗ = 0.6.34 That is, we consider a big drop,
25%, in trust, which is our benchmark experiment. Figure 1 reports both the real and
monetary effects of trust shocks on the macroeconomy. The horizontal axis is the trust
parameter θ, which ranges from 0.4 to 0.8, measuring the size of trust shocks.35
On the real side of the economy, in this experiment, since entrepreneurs become less
trustworthy and hence are less able to borrow, young workers would divert less of their
savings into investment goods, which leads to a fall in capital investment by 35.76%.
This, in turn, causes real output to fall by 6.19%. Young workers would demand
more government money and m increases by 29.52%. As public debt increases, the
government now has to increase real tax revenues τ to balance the budget. Since old
33Note that the real return on capital r can be solved by using either equation (7) or equation (8).
Specifically, r = R
µ
= 1.34 , or r = θ̂
(k̂)1−α
= 1.34.
34Notice that trust shocks are assumed to be unexpected and permanent.
35To interpret the numbers, for example, θ = 0.4 reports the results when there is a bigger drop,
50% (from θ = 0.8 to θ = 0.4), in the trust parameter.
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workers (the previous young workers) bear the tax burden, their consumption would
unambiguously fall.36
To examine the monetary effects of trust shocks on the economy, note that, to clear
the money market, an increase in the real demand for government money would cause
the price level to fall, inducing transitory deflation. This also means the real value of
money (1/p) has to increase. In our benchmark experiment, the price level falls by
22.79%. In addition, private money (deposits) Q falls by around 50%. This is because
both capital investment and the price level fall in the financial crisis. Finally, note
that the money multiplier is endogenously determined in this model, i.e., MM ≡ k
m
, a
decline in capital investment and an increase in the real demand for money would both
cause the money multiplier to fall; in our benchmark experiment, the money multiplier
drops by 50.41%. Thus, this model generates a contraction in private money and a fall
in the money multiplier, which are often observed in economic recessions (see Disyatat,
2011). In sum, the model shows that trust shocks can have significant effects on both
the real and monetary variables, with salient features that are in line with financial
crises in history (see Kindleberger, 1978; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
6 Conclusion
Understanding trust is of primary importance to the theory of money and business
cycle fluctuations. However, the literature has provided few formal models upon which
the impact of trust on the macroeconomy can be studied. This is presumably be-
cause trust is intangible and hard to model, and it has proved difficult to incorporate
money and credit into a standard general equilibrium framework of macroeconomics.
36Note that, however, the welfare effects of trust shocks on young entrepreneurs’ consumption are
ambiguous, as indicated by Proposition 3. In this experiment, the expected consumption of young
entrepreneurs actually increases.
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This paper develops an overlapping generations model (OLG) with public and private
money and studies the effects of trust shocks on the economy. In this paper, trust is
modelled as limited commitment between borrowers and lenders. I assume, for moral
hazard reasons, a borrower who issues IOUs (private money) can credibly commit to
repay at most a fraction of his or her future output. The fraction thus captures the
effective degree of commitment, or "trust", in the economy. The paper shows that an
evaporation of trust can engineer a financial crisis, with substantial effects on both the
real and monetary variables.
In the model, an unexpected drop in the trust parameter causes young workers
to divert less of their savings into investment goods and more of their savings into
consumption goods. A fall in capital investment in turn leads to a decline in real
output. As young workers demand more public money, the government has to raise
more revenues through taxation and thus the real taxes increase. In the model, since
old workers (the previous young workers) pay the tax, the expected consumption of
young workers unambiguously falls. I show that, from the perspective of welfare, trust
shocks can have detrimental effects on both workers and entrepreneurs.
Equipped with a modelling device where public and private money coexist, the
model is able to examine the monetary effects of trust shocks. In particular, the
model offers an explanation of inflation dynamics, complementary to the standard
New Keynesian DSGE framework. The model shows that, to clear the money market,
an increase in the real demand for government money causes the price level to fall,
inducing transitory deflation. This also means the real value of government money
has to increase. This result is in line with the secular deflation during and following
the Great Recession. In addition, the decline in capital investment and the price level
also implies that the amount of deposits has to shrink in a financial crisis. Finally, the
money multiplier is endogenously determined in this model. I show that, once trust
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shocks hit the economy, the money multiplier drops. This is due to the decrease in
capital investment and the increase in the demand for government money. In a nutshell,
the model shows how a lack of trust can mimic a financial crisis, with significant effects
on both the real and monetary variables in the economy.
Two final remarks are in order. First, studying trust in a monetary economy is
a fruitful starting point for macroeconomics. This paper models trust as a limited
commitment friction and provides an attempt at formally evaluating the impact of
trust shocks on the macroeconomy. However, this is only one approach to introduce
trust into a monetary model. Trust can also be captured by asset’s liquidity (see Bigio,
2015; Kiyotaki and Moore, 2019). For example, the reason why one asset is more liquid
than another asset is because the asset is more trustworthy. Cash and reserves are the
most liquid assets because they are backed by the government. Thus, understanding
trust in a model where assets differ in their liquidity characteristics is also interesting.
Second, the low-inflation (deflation) episodes of the Great Recession have posed
a great challenge on New Keynesian DSGE models (see Hall, 2011). The "missing
disinflation" presents a big puzzle for many economists. This paper offers an alternative
explanation on the secular deflation during and following the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. In this model, it is the real demand for government money that ultimately
influences the price level. However, more research should be conducted to explain the
"missing disinflation" from the Great Recession.
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Figure 1
The Real and Monetary Effects of Trust Shocks on the Economy
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Note that: The horizontal axis represents the level of trust, θ, in the economy. The vertical axis
reports percentage deviations from steady state (when θ̂ = 0.8), once θ drops unexpectedly form 0.8
to the current level.
